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Myths, Realities, and the 
Political World*: The 
Anthropology of Insanity 
Defense ~tt i tudes 
Michael L. Perlin, JD 
The author presents the case that society's efforts to understand the insanity 
defense and insanity-pleading defendants are doomed to intellectual, moral, and 
political gridlock unless we are willing to take a fresh look at the doctrine through 
a series of filters-empirical research, scientific discovery, moral philosophy, 
cognitive and moral psychology, and sociology-in an effort to confront the single 
most important (but rarely asked) question: why do we feel the way we do about 
"these people" (insanity pleaders)? He examines this question finally through a 
model of structural anthropology and concludes that until we come to grips with 
the extent to which ours is a "culture of punishment," we can make no headway 
in solving the insanity defense dilemma. 
I wrote The Jurisprudence of the Insanity 
Defense for a combination of reasons. 
Primarily, I was concerned that we had 
* Bob Dylan, "Political World" (OH MERCY, Special 
Rider Co., 1989): 
We live in a political world 
Love don't have any place 
We're living in times where men commit crimes 
And crime don't have a face 
. . .  
We live in a political world 
Where mercy walks the plank 
. . .  
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been frittering away our intellectual cap- 
ital for decades in our approach to what 
we see as "the insanity defense problem." 
We expended countless person-hours 
worrying about cognitive tests, affective 
tests, and nonexistent lemon squeezers. 
We spent thousands of court hours on 
briefs, test cases, appeals. and hearings 
contesting such questions as the quantum 
of proof in the insanity acquittal retention 
hearing. We looked to deeply flawed and 
basically meretricious alternatives such as 
the guilty but mentally ill verdict as a 
palliative to our consciences and as a 
means of conning ourselves that we were, 
in fact, "doing something" about the in- 
sanity defense "problem." 
Yet, I felt that all of this mattered per- 
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ilously little. Why did I say this? Because 
we continued to do precisely what we 
have done for decades, centuries, and per- 
haps millennia. We spout platitudes, we 
reify myths, we create straw men, we talk 
angrily about insanity defense "abuse," 
we look longingly to insanity defense 
"abolition" or "reduction" as panaceas 
(not simply to the question at hand, but 
fantastically, as a means of solving all 
contemporary crime problems); we speak 
scornfully of slick lawyers and deceitful 
experts; we automatically assume that a 
defendant who raises the insanity defense 
must be faking (although, at least one 
court opinion and one voter survey 
reveals-somewhat remarkably, I 
thought-that it doesn't matter if the plea 
is "real" or "faked; our antipathy is al- 
most identical); finally, we deride psy- 
chodynamic and behavioral explanations 
of "crazy" behavior when it appears "ob- 
vious" to one and all that the defendant, 
in fact, "did it." 
To do all this, we must be willing to 
jump through quite a set of hoops. We 
must be willing-in spite of unanimous 
evidence to the contrary-to adhere to a 
set of empirical and behavioral myths 
about the plea's frequency and success 
rate, its dispositional outcomes, etc. We 
must be willing to close our eyes to a 
series of validated testing instruments; to 
ignore scientific evidence on brain bio- 
chemistry; to discredit philosophical rea- 
soning-and we regularly do just that. 
I thus decided to write this book, The 
Jurisprudence of the Insanity Defense, in 
an effort to answer the questions that I 
just raised. And when I actually started to 
write a book, I realized that all of these 
questions were somehow subordinate to 
(and served to subtly obscure) the one 
overarching question that was never spe- 
cifically asked or articulated, but which, it 
seemed to me, totally dominated the 
"deep structures" of our insanity defense 
discourse: why do we feel the way we do 
about "those people"? 
The answer to that question, it seemed 
to me, would allow us to collapse all of 
the other questions into one that might 
actually be-at least in part-answerable 
and that might even give us some guid- 
ance as to what, if anything, we could do 
to resolve (or at least to clarify) the "in- 
sanity defense problem." At the base of 
all of the questions, all the myths, all the 
misstatements, all the misassumptions, 
there remained-or so it seemed to me- 
one basic truth: that we simply didn't 
care. 
The Roots of Our Apathy 
We didn't care about the empirical re- 
alities, about the behavioral realities, 
about scientific tests, about philosophical 
advances, about constitutional interpreta- 
tions. We didn't care for what now 
seemed to me to be a set of very obvious 
reasons: that there was something about 
the use of the insanity defense, and about 
the persona of the insanity defense 
pleader (and by extension, his lawyer and 
the expert witness testifying on his be- 
half), that revolted the general public to 
the core; that the successful insanity 
pleader truly was one of the most "de- 
spised" individuals in society; that the use 
of the insanity defense seemed to reflect, 
to so many Americans of every political 
stripe, all that was wrong with this coun- 
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try and with its legal system; and that the 
continued existence of the insanity de- 
fense simply was dissonant with the po- 
litical world that we had constructed. 
It didn't matter whether we reified 
myths and ignored realities, because it 
was the myths that were consonant with 
the schema that we had painted of our 
criminal justice system. To a great extent, 
like all other myths, these myths have 
proven impervious to proofs of data and 
rational argument alike. 
I had been thinking about these issues 
for a long time and had always been 
struck by the way that the "scholarly" 
debate and the "public" debate seemed to 
be taking place in two entirely different 
force fields. Scholars pondered the true 
doctrinal differences between the 
M'Naghten test, the Model Penal Code, 
and the "irresistible impulse" test, creat- 
ing a set of obscure and implausible hy- 
pothetical~ having nothing to do with the 
insanity defense in practice or in the lives 
of mentally disordered offenders in gen- 
eral. All of this was done in a vain effort 
to convince the public that changes in the 
substantive wording of the test really mat- 
tered. The public, on the other hand, ap- 
peared to be profoundly disinterested in 
the defense, unless and until one of two 
things happened: either a politician an- 
nounced that abolition of the defense 
would solve the nation's crime problems, 
or a high-profile case involving a sympa- 
thetic victim captured media attention. 
The first of these events happened in 
the early 1970s when President Nixon- 
without any empirical support, by the 
way-charged that the defense was sub- 
ject to "unconscionable abuse."' There 
was a flurry of activity at that time, but it 
seemed to dissipate fairly rapidly (and 
that dissipation was perhaps spurred on 
by a finding that, in the calendar year 
when the charge was made, there were 
only four insanity acquittals recorded in 
all federal jurisdictions). 
The second, of course, did not dissi- 
pate. When John Hinckley shot and at- 
tempted to assassinate President Reagan, 
the path of the insanity defense was for- 
ever altered in this country. Hinckley's 
successful use of the defense immediately 
shifted the entire playing field and altered 
the terms of the debate. The entire debate 
now became dramatically flipped: would 
the insanity defense-a defense whose 
roots were found in the Talmud, the 
Codes of Justinian, and the Dooms of 
Alfred2-survive John Hinckley's ex- 
pression of unrequited love for Jodie Fos- 
ter? Insanity defense supporters found 
themselves frantically engaged in rear- 
guard actions. Abolition became the cen- 
terpiece of a major federal crime bill, 
legislation that was quickly mimicked in 
many states. And after lengthy congres- 
sional hearings, the fact that the defense 
was reduced from the American Law In- 
stitute (ALI)/Model Penal Code test to the 
M'Naghten rules of 1843 was seen as a 
major "victory" for insanity defense sup- 
porter~.~.  
States followed suit quickly, both lim- 
iting the substantive tests while tightening 
procedural rules. All of this meant that 
the use of the insanity defense-never a 
particularly attractive option to criminal 
defendants and never one that was used 
extensively-was going to be even rarer 
and certainly was going to be greeted 
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even more critically by judges, jurors, the 
media, and the general public. 
In short, since the passage of the Insan- 
ity Defense Reform Act of 1984,5 the 
insanity defense landscape has changed 
dramatically and irrevocably. Any politi- 
cian or elected judge willing to support it 
as a matter of principle has to realize that 
it will serve as a convenient symbol for an 
"anti-crime" opponent to focus upon. 
Any lawyer representing a severely men- 
tally disabled criminal defendant must 
recognize that, if she enters an insanity 
defense plea, the jurors will likely be 
suspicious, negative, and hostile. Any ed- 
itorial writer or columnist suggesting that 
the defense remains a viable alternative 
needs to know that such a position will 
likely inspire a rash of angry letters to the 
editor denouncing the supporter as soft on 
crime, or worse. And any law professor 
(or forensic mental health professional) 
willing to be identified as a supporter of 
the defense must realize that she is fight- 
ing a very lonely battle. 
The Roots of Dissonance 
What is it about the insanity defense 
that affects us this way? Why is the pub- 
lic's reaction so homogenous, and why is 
it so dissonant from that of many of the 
professionals who have spent their lives 
studying these questions?t Why is the 
insanity defense the screen upon which 
the community projects its "visions of 
criminal justice"? These are some of the 
t I make some exceptions here, of course: Dr. Abraham 
Halpem has been a principled opponent of the insanity 
defense for decades. We disagree on the merits, but I 
need to articulate my respect for Dr. Halpem and his 
position and emphasize that my criticism of insanity 
defense critics in no way goes to him or to his positions. 
questions that must be addressed in this 
inquiry. 
First, let us see what can be determined 
about attitudes from the defining congres- 
sional hearings that followed the Hinck- 
ley insanity acquittal. I start here because 
my sense is that, if we scrutinize these 
hearings, we can begin to understand how 
we, the general public, really do construct 
the insanity defense and why we continue 
to focus on it irrationally and obsessively 
as the root of all that is wrong with the 
American criminal justice system. 
According to Representative Coughlin, 
insanity defense reform was a Maginot 
line of sorts: "nothing less than the cred- 
ibility of our Federal justice system is at 
stake," he said in underscoring what he 
saw as the significance of the hearings.6 
This hyperbole was repeated continu- 
ously, in different contexts, by other 
members of both Houses of Congress 
during the debates. Thus, Attorney Gen- 
eral Meese argued that insanity defense 
abolition would "rid . . . the streets of 
some of the most dangerous people that 
are out there, that are committing a dis- 
proportionate amount of  crime^."^ Sena- 
tor Quayle asserted that the "decadent 
demoralizing court decisions . . . pam- 
pered criminals" and gave defendants the 
right to kill "innocent people with impu- 
 nit^."^ Senator Symms added that a crim- 
inal justice system that included an in- 
sanity defense could "no longer represent 
. . . a civilized society."9 
Next, look at what our legislators said 
about the use of the defense: "a safe har- 
bor for criminals who bamboozle a 
"a rich man's defense""; a doc- 
trine-this from former attorney General 
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William French Smith-that allows "so 
many persons [italics added] to commit 
crimes of violence . . . and have the door 
opened to them to return to . . . society,"12 
in former U.S. Attorney Giuliani's words, 
"roam[ing] the streets"13; a defense that 
includes "everything from alcoholism and 
drug addiction to heartburn and itching" 
(this latter observation, by the way, was 
characterized as a "thoughtful" one)14; 
and finally, and most probatively, again 
in Giuliani's words, a defense that allows 
defendants to "get away with murder" in 
"many, many ca~es . " '~  
Each of these statements, of course, is a 
textbook parody of the empirical and be- 
havioral data. The insanity defense is 
rarely used and is disproportionately used 
in cases involving indigent defendants; 
jurors are rarely deceived; not guilty by 
reason of insanity (NGRI) acquittees of- 
ten spend double the amount of time in- 
stitutionalized as defendants charged with 
the same crimes; two-thirds of insanity 
pleas are raised in cases not involving a 
victim's death. 16- l 7  
Of course, the fact that these statements 
were myths may not have mattered much: 
the House (of Representatives) Report ac- 
companying the Insanity Defense Reform 
Act astonishingly conceded that the basic 
beliefs about the insanity defense were 
myths, but justified the new legislation 
nonetheless because these myths "under- 
mined public faith in the criminal justice 
system."18 This little-noticed conces- 
sion-that Congress must assuage senti- 
ment that it knows to be false-reflects 
the lasting power of the insanity defense 
myths. 
Myths and Symbols 
The myths speak to the symbol. The 
insanity defense, simply put, is and al- 
ways has been "the acid test of our atti- 
tudes toward the insane and toward the 
criminal law itself."19 Judge Bazelon 
called it a "scapegoat for the entire crim- 
inal justice system."20 It symbolizes "the 
loss of social control in the eyes of the 
public."2' 
The defense, in short, is simply disso- 
nant with our perceptions of how a crim- 
inal justice system "should" operate. Its 
purported abuse symbolizes the alleged 
breakdown of law and order, the failure 
of the crime control model, the ascen- 
dancy of a "liberal," exculpatory, excuse- 
ridden jurisprudence, and these symbols 
are at play in the most charged context 
imaginable-the trial of a mentally dis- 
abled criminal defendant. 
Historical Perspectives 
These findings suggest that it is neces- 
sary to distance oneself by viewing the 
subject in its historical context. It was 
clear that there were parallels between the 
Hinckley trial and the trial of Daniel 
M'Naghten (and that public reactions 
were astonishingly similar to both ver- 
dicts), but the findings force us to further 
consider the origins of our attitudes about 
mental illness, about crime, and about 
"evil." Perhaps this inquiry might shed 
some light on why we do the things we do 
when it comes to mentally disabled crim- 
inal defendants. 
Mental Illness and Sin This research 
illuminated some important historical 
constants: for 5,000 years, conceptions of 
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mental illness have been linked inextrica- 
bly to concepts of sin. Mental illness was 
seen, more than 2,000 years ago, as "a 
punishment sent by God."22 Through the 
Middle Ages, "demonic possession re- 
main[ed] the simplest, the most dramatic 
and, secretly, the most attractive of all 
explanations of insanity."23 Mental dis- 
ease was God's punishment for sin, and 
mentally disabled persons were seen as 
agents of the devil.$ 
It is no wonder that Michael Foucault 
suggested that this "face of madness" has 
"haunted" Western man's imagination for 
at least 5,000 years.25 Thus it is no sur- 
prise that religious attitudes always ex- 
erted great influence on the medical 
"treatment" of the mentally ill, and to a 
great extent our characterizations of 
"sickness" track precisely what medieval 
theologians called "sin."26 
This conflation of mental illness and 
sin needs to be considered in the context 
of the role of punishment in our criminal 
justice system. When President Reagan 
campaigned for Republican senators 
whom he could count on to appoint 
"tough" federal judges, he said pointedly: 
"We don't need a bunch of sociology 
majors on the bench"; and when Attorney 
General Thornburgh spoke at the Na- 
tional Crime Summit, he said: "We are 
not here . . . to discuss sociological 
theory,"27. 28 what were they saying? On 
one level, at least, they were rejecting 
what society often sees as psychodynamic 
psychiatry's perceived "peculiar tolerant 
$ "In post-medieval times the retarded, together with . . . 
the insane, from whom they were not generally distin- 
guished, were viewed as the progeny of the supernatural, 
and in the last several centuries as agents of the 
attitudes toward criminal beha~ior,"~' 
and its desire to undermine the powerful 
force of punishment in the criminal jus- 
tice system.30 
It is to this "culture of punishment" that 
I want to turn briefly, because I do not 
think we can begin to grasp underlying 
issues without giving this phenomenon 
some serious consideration. 
Culture of Punishment Punishment 
was originally a "ritualistic device" con- 
veying "moral condemnation," "inflicting 
humiliation," and dramatizing evil 
through a public "degradation ceremo- 
ny."315 Punishment of criminals was seen 
as a means of both avoiding mob violence 
and furthering social solidarity by pro- 
tecting "against the terrifying anxiety that 
the forces of good might not triumph 
against the forces of evil after all."32 
None of this, however, addresses the 
question of why we need to punish. This 
is not an easy question, but I believe the 
best explanation is simply that our innate 
sense of justice is profoundly disturbed if 
we see another go unpunished for his 
antisocial behavior. In J. C.   lug el's^^ 
words: 
By punishing the criminal, we are not only 
showing that he can't 'get away with it,' but 
holding him up as a terrifying example to our 
tempted and rebellious selves. . . . Connected 
with this is the danger with which our whole 
notion of justice is threatened when we observe 
that a criminal goes unpunished. . . . 
§ R. ~ o l d t ~ '  quoting Gordon Hawkins, Punishment and 
deterrence: the educative, moralizing, and habituative 
effects, Wis L Rev, 550-60, 1969; see also Hawkins, 
supra at 555: "Punishment is a ritualistic device de- 
signed to influence by intimating symbolically social 
disapproval and society's moral condemnation." 
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In short, criminal punishment is society's 
antiaggression safety valve; we project 
our guilt, blame, shame, and fear, express 
our collective anger and hostility, and 
show the criminal that he cannot succumb 
to temptations (as we (the law abiding) do 
not succumb), and thus preserve the illu- 
sion of an even-handed justice system.34 
Of course, the insanity defense flies in 
the face of all of this. For many reasons, 
the insanity defense serves as the perfect 
scapegoat for all that is perceived as in- 
explicable about our criminal justice sys- 
tem. It symbolizes "the most profound 
issues in social and criminal justice." It 
underscores the gap between the public's 
perceptions of how the criminal justice 
system should operate and the way that, 
in a handful of cases, a "factually guilty" 
person can be diverted from criminal pun- 
ishment because of moral or legal nonre- 
sponsibility. 
Sin, Evil, and Madness Beyond this, 
the insanity defense flies in the face of the 
way that we have traditionally conflated 
sin, evil, and madness. Although modern 
psychiatry and psychology illuminate 
many of the reasons why certain criminal 
defendants commit apparently incompre- 
hensible, "crazy" acts, we reject such psy- 
chodynamic explanations, both on per- 
sonal and justice-system levels. We do 
this because such an explanation-in- 
deed, the existence of the insanity defense 
itself-robs us of our need (our desire, 
our compulsion) to mete out punishment 
to the transgressor. Most strikingly, we do 
this even when we are faced with incon- 
trovertible evidence that the "successful" 
use of an insanity defense can lead to 
significantly longer terms of punishment 
in significantly more punitive facilities 
than the individual would have been sub- 
jected to had he pled guilty or been found 
guilty after a trial.36 
Insanity Defense Myths 
What is there about the insanity de- 
fense that inspires such massive societal 
irrationality? Why do we adhere to these 
myths, ignore the reams of rational data 
that patiently rebut them, and willfully 
blind ourselves to the behavioral and em- 
pirical realities that are well known to all 
serious researchers in this area? It is to 
these questions that I now turn. 
Our insanity defense jurisprudence is 
premised on a series of empirical and 
behavioral myths, myths that empirical 
research has revealed to be "unequivo- 
cally disproven by the facts."37 There are 
at least eight separate empirical myths to 
be addressed briefly. 
Myth #I: The Insanity Defense Is 
Overused All empirical analyses have 
been consistent: the public at large and 
the legal profession (especially legisla- 
tors) "dramatically" and "grossly" over- 
estimate both the frequency and the suc- 
cess rate of the insanity plea, an error 
"undoubtedly . . . abetted" by media dis- 
tortions. The most recent research re- 
veals, for instance, that the insanity de- 
fense is used in only about one percent of 
all felony cases and is successful just 
about one-quarter of the time.38 
Myth #2: Use of the Insanity Defense 
Is Limited to Murder Cases In one ju- 
risdiction where the data have been 
closely studied, contrary to expectations, 
slightly less than one-third of the success- 
ful insanity pleas entered over an eight- 
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year period were reached in cases involv- 
ing a victim's death.39 Furthermore, 
individuals who plead insanity in murder 
cases are no more successful in being 
found NGRI than persons charged with 
other crimes.40 
Myth #3: There Is No Risk to the 
Defendant Who Pleads Insanity De- 
fendants who asserted an insanity defense 
at trial, and who were ultimately found 
guilty of their charges, served signifi- 
cantly longer sentences than defendants 
tried on similar charges who did not as- 
sert the insanity defense. The same ratio 
is found when only homicide cases are 
~onsidered.~' 
Myth #4: NGRI Acquittees Are 
Quickly Released from Custody A 
comprehensive study of California prac- 
tice showed that only one percent of in- 
sanity acquittees were released following 
their NGRI verdict and that another four 
percent were placed on conditional re- 
lease, the remaining 95 percent being 
h~spi ta l ized .~~ 
Myth #5: NGRI Acquittees Spend 
Much Less Time in Custody Than Do 
Defendants Convicted of the Same Of- 
fenses. Contrary to this perception, 
NGRI acquittees spend almost double the 
amount of time that defendants convicted 
of similar charges spend in prison settings 
and often face a lifetime of postrelease 
judicial oversight. In California, those 
found NGRI of nonviolent crimes were 
confined for periods over nine times as 
Myth #6: Criminal Defendants Who 
Plead Insanity Are Usually Faking 
This is perhaps the oldest of the insanity 
defense myths, one that has bedeviled 
American jurisprudence since the mid- 
19th century. Of the 141 individuals 
found NGRI in one jurisdiction over an 
eight-year period, there was no dispute 
that 115 were schizophrenic (including 38 
of the 46 cases involving a victim's 
death), and in only three cases was the 
diagnostician unwilling or unable to spec- 
ify the nature of the patient's mental ill- 
n e s ~ . ~ ~ ,  46a 
Myth # 7: Most Insanity Defense Tri- 
als Feature "Battles of the Experts" 
The public's false perception of the cir- 
cus-like "battle of the experts" is one of 
the most telling reasons for the rejection 
of psychodynamic principles by the legal 
system. A dramatic case such as the 
Hinckley trial, of course, reinforced these 
perceptions. The empirical reality is quite 
different. On the average, there is exam- 
iner agreement in 88 percent of all insan- 
ity cases.47* 48 
Noting the existence of these myths, 
however, is simply informational. It does 
not explain why the myths develop or 
why they persist in the face of unani- 
mous, hard data to the contrary; or why 
only 3 or 4 of approximately 400 news- 
paper articles that I have read in the past 
year about the use of the insanity defense 
have even hinted at the empirical truths 
refuting these myths. 
One of the first explanations must be 
the law's ongoing and generalized rejec- 
tion of psychodynamic principles as a 
means of explaining human behavior. I 
see three aspects of this rejection as es- 
pecially important: the roots of the legal 
system's profound ambivalence about 
psychiatry and toward psychiatrists; the 
importance of punishment in our system 
12 Bull Am Acad Psychiatry Law, Vol. 24, No. 1, 1996 
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of criminal justice, and the specific, ob- 
sessive fears that are regularly uncabined 
in response to any suggestion that psy- 
chodynamic principles can aid the law in 
disposing of cases involving mentally dis- 
abled criminal defendants. 
The Law's Ambivalence Toward 
Psychiatry 
This ambivalence is not news. The law 
has always been-paradoxically-fasci- 
nated and repelled by, and overwhelm- 
ingly ambivalent about, psychiatry's role 
in the adjudicative process. On one hand, 
courts frantically desire to have mental 
health professionals testify as to long- 
term future dangerousness (an expertise 
that psychiatrists for the most part freely 
acknowledge they do not have) and "take 
the weight" on difficult cornrnitJrelease 
decisions (especially in cases involving 
retention hearings of insanity acquittees), 
while at the same time characterizing psy- 
chiatry as "the ultimate wizardry" or psy- 
chiatrists as "medicine men" or "shaman- 
istic wizards." 
This ambivalence permeates mental 
disability law. Psychiatric expertise is 
valued when it serves a social control 
function of the law (such as testifying in 
involuntary civil commitment proceed- 
ings in support of commitment applica- 
tions), but is devalued when it appears to 
subvert that purpose (such as testifying in 
insanity defense cases in support of a 
defendant's nonresponsibility claim).49. " 
Anthropology and the Insanity 
Defense 
What does any of this have to do with 
anthropology? Anthropologists study cul- 
ture; they study the form and structure of 
culture; the study the content of ~ul ture .~ '  
Anthropologists study attitudes-social 
attitudes, cultural attitudes and political 
att i t~des. '~ And they study myths.53 
The study of attitudes and myths is 
particularly relevant here. It is impossible 
to understand the politics of the insanity 
defense jurisprudence without under- 
standing the social and cultural attitudes 
that drive legislative and judicial deci- 
sionmaking as well as public policy. And 
it is also impossible to understand this 
phenomenon without understanding the 
social and cultural myths that drive the 
behavioral and empirical myths. I use the 
word "myth" self-consciously, as social 
anthropologists do: "a sacred tale about 
past events which is used to justify social 
action in the present."54 
I have tried to demonstrate the roots of 
the insanity defense myths as well as their 
universality. What is as important as their 
existence, in addition, is the firmness of 
our beliefs in them as objective realities. 
Every civilization, according to Claude 
LCvi-Strauss, "tends to overestimate the 
objective orientation of its thought, and 
this tendency is never ab~ent."'~ So it is 
with the insanity defense. 
Just as "madness" has specific cultural 
meanings56 and just as cultural factors 
affect the course of major mental ill- 
n e ~ s , ' ~  we can now say that attitudes to- 
ward the insanity defense have such 
meanings and affect the course of treat- 
ment (and the ultimate disposition) of the 
case of an insanity-pleading offender. 
Just as explanatory models of sickness are 
"sets of generalizations which enable the 
thinker to produce information about par- 
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ticular sickness episodes and events,"58 
so can we say that explanatory models of 
the insanity defense plea and pleaders do 
the same thing. 
Let me try to "tease this out" a bit more 
specifically by narrowing my inquiry to 
what I understand is the school of struc- 
tural anthropology. Structuralists agree 
that all culture consists of sets of concepts 
that are in psychological tension with 
each other (e.g., we cannot make sense of 
"black" without realizing that it contrasts 
with "white"; we can't understand "citi- 
zenship" without understanding that it 
contrasts with "alienage.")59 Now con- 
sider how Richard ~ e r e l m a n ~ '  character- 
izes this: 
Such narratives appear in myths, rituals, popu- 
lar culture, ceremonies or even institutionalized 
behaviour in which exemplary persons (heroes, 
villains, etc.) . . . depict components of the sets 
themselves. In effect, such persons 'act out,' 
'display,' or 'exercise' the culture. 
Building on these insights in a recent 
manuscript, Douglas ~ o s s m a n ~ '  looks at 
the way we construct mentally ill persons, 
specifically mentally ill homeless per- 
sons: 
This . . . helps us appreciate how mentally ill 
persons . . . are ambiguous, perplexing, and 
troubling figures in the context of American 
political culture. They represent a set of con- 
tradictions to us because they fail to tlt well into 
the set of structural oppositions that our culture 
gives us to organize our experience. American 
mythologized individualism ascribes to persons 
a high level of autonomy, personal responsibil- 
ity, and rationality; these are the ingredients 
needed for persons to vindicate their natural 
goodness amidst corrupting social influences. 
But left alone, the homeless mentally ill "seem" 
in some ways to be very natural and clearly 
rejecting society's norms, yet they make trou- 
bling choices. 
Think, in this context, about the insan- 
ity defense, about its roots and our atti- 
tudes. Think about how we structure good 
and evil, well and sick, lawful and unlaw- 
ful, sane and insane. And think about the 
way that, on one hand, the existence of an 
insanity defense satisfies our needs for 
expressing such tensions (as the D.C. cir- 
cuit court said in United States v. 
Brawner, "'free will' is the postulate of 
responsibility under our jurispru- 
d e n ~ e " ) , ~ ~  but on the other hand creates a 
tension (where it appears to let a factually 
guilty person "get away with it") that may 
simply be "too much" for our legal sys- 
tem's "tensile strength." 
This approach piqued my curiosity, so 
I decided to continue a bit further. For the 
past year, I have conducted a daily com- 
puter search for the words "insanity de- 
fense" in the NEWS library of the NEXIS 
database on the LEXIS system to show 
the extent to which the myths that I have 
been talking about persist and the way 
they seem to fit into this structural anthro- 
pological model. 
The New Research The database re- 
veals few surprises. According to the 
news media, the allegedly "popular" in- 
sanity d e f e n ~ e ~ ~ ~ n o t h i n g  more than a 
"legalistic slight of hand"64-is a "re- 
ward" to mentally disabled defendants for 
"staying a "travesty,"66 a "loop- 
hole,"67 a "refuge,"68 a " t e ~ h n i c a l i t ~ , " ~ ~  
one of the "absurdities of state law,"70 
perhaps a "monstrous f r a ~ d . " ~ '  It is 
used-again, allegedly-in cases involv- 
ing "mild disorders or a sudden disap- 
pointment or mounting frustrations . . . or 
a less-than-perfect ~h i ldhood . "~~  It is re- 
sponsible for "burying the traditional 
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Judeo-Christian notion of moral respon- 
sibility under a tower of p~ychobabble."~' 
When it is pleaded, successful defen- 
dants are perceived either as spending a 
"short time" in mental hospitals (before 
being released to unsupervised free- 
d ~ m ) , ~ ~  or as being simply "set free."75 
Defendants' criminal responsibility is 
still being assessed by visual frames of 
reference: if he didn't "seem frenzied"76 
or appear insane, then "there's no crazi- 
ness here;"77 and of course, the Dan 
White "Twinkie defense" continues to be 
seen as some kind of norm in insanity 
c a ~ e s . ~ ~ - ~ O  
The "default drive" of prosecutors is 
simply to argue that the defendant was 
faking or Criminal de- 
fense lawyers may refer to their own in- 
sanity-pleading clients as "a monster, a 
Franken~tein."~~ Potential jurors are 
sometimes excused because they appear 
too eager to sit on insanity defense cases 
(and certainly not because of their desire 
to enter an NGRI verdict).86 Even a 
spokesperson for the American Psychiat- 
ric Association misinforms the press as to 
the appropriate test for assessing the need 
for continuing confinement of insanity 
acquit tee^.^^ 
Additionally, of course, politicians fo- 
cus on abolition of the insanity defense as 
a panacea for urban crime problems, call- 
ing it "one of the absurdities of state 
law,"" providing a hiding place for crim- 
inals "to avoid responsibility."g9 Legisla- 
tive candidates point to insanity defense 
support as an indicium of an opponent 
being soft on crime.90 These positions are 
regularly endorsed in newspaper editori- 
a l ~ . ~ ~ - ~ ~  Finally, the voice of the citi- 
zenry-through letters to the editors-is 
virtually identical.loO In the words of a 
13-year-old writing about the O.J. trial to 
the Fresno Bee: 
Of course, if he did do it, there's always the 
good old temporary insanity defense, a sure-fire 
way to bail out of just about any heinous crime, 
especially murder.lO' 
The Roots of the Myths 
Why do these myths persist? Why did 
they originally emerge? Why have they 
shown such remarkable longevity? Why 
do cases such as Hinckley's have such a 
profound effect on the perpetuation of the 
myths? Why do they appear essential to 
the continued order of society? Why do 
they continue to capture a significant por- 
tion of the general public and the legal 
community? How do they reflect a "com- 
munity consciousness"? Finally, why 
may their persistence doom any attempt 
to establish a rational insanity defense 
jurisprudence, no matter how much con- 
flicting empirical data are revealed? 
To answer these questions, it is neces- 
sary to look at the roots of these myths. 
An examination of the literature and the 
case law reveals at least four reasons for 
the myths' persistence: ( I )  the (irrational) 
fear that defendants will "beat the rap" 
through fakery, a millennium-old fear 
that has its roots in a general disbelief in 
mental illness, and a deep-seated distrust 
of "manipulative" criminal defense law- 
yers invested with the ability to "con" 
jurors into accepting spurious expert tes- 
timony; lo2 (2) the sense (among members 
of the legal community and the general 
public) that there is "something different" 
about mental illness and organic illness, 
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so that, while certain physiologic disabil- 
ities may be seen as legitimately exculpa- 
tory, "mere" emotional handicaps are not; 
(3) the demand that a defendant conform 
to popular images of extreme "craziness" 
in order to be "legitimately insane," a 
demand with which Chief Justice 
Rehnquist and other members of the cur- 
rent Supreme Court appear entirely com- 
fortable; and (4) a fear that the "soft," 
exculpatory sciences of psychiatry and 
psychology, claiming expertise in almost 
all areas of behavior, will somehow over- 
whelm the criminal justice system by 
thwarting the system's crime control 
component. '03 
Why is this? Why do we feel this way? 
Explanations of the Myths 
This is a question that seems to me to 
be rarely asked and even more rarely an- 
swered. I decided to approach it, though, 
because I thought that unless we look 
long and hard at this question-basically, 
what is there about the way we think, 
reason, and react that makes us suscepti- 
ble to these myths-all of our study and 
time would be little more than academic. 
I thus have focused on several overlap- 
ping constructs drawn from cognitive 
psychology. law, sociology, philosophy, 
and my own invention in an effort to 
answer the question. I will first explain 
briefly what I mean by each of these 
concepts and then turn to their relation- 
ship to the way we feel about the insanity 
defense. 
First, the use of heuristics (a cognitive 
psychology construct that refers to the 
implicit thinking devices that individuals 
use to simplify complex, information- 
processing tasks) leads to distorted and 
systematically erroneous decisions and 
causes decisionmakers to "ignore or mis- 
use items of rationally useful informa- 
tion." One single vivid, memorable case 
overwhelms mountains of abstract, color- 
less data upon which rational choices 
should be made.'04 
Thus, through the "availability" heuris- 
tic, we judge the probability or frequency 
of an event based on the ease with which 
we recall it.'05 Through the "typification" 
heuristic, we characterize a current expe- 
rience via reference to past stereotypic 
behavior; through the "attribution" heu- 
ristic, we interpret a wide variety of ad- 
ditional information to reinforce preexist- 
ing stereotypes.Io6 
Next is the concept of ordinary com- 
mon sense (OCS). The positions fre- 
quently taken by Chief Justice Rehnquist 
and Justice Thomas in criminal procedure 
cases best highlight the power of OCS as 
an unconscious animator of legal deci- 
sionmaking. Such positions frequently 
demonstrate a total lack of awareness of 
the underlying psychological issues and 
focus on such superficial issues as 
whether a putatively mentally disabled 
criminal defendant bears a "normal ap- 
pearance." '07 
These are not the first jurists to exhibit 
this sort of close-mindedness. Trial 
judges will typically say "he [the defen- 
dant] doesn't look sick to me," or, even 
more revealingly, "he is as healthy as you 
or me."10s In short, where defendants do 
not conform to "popular images of 'cra- 
ziness,"' the notion of a handicapping 
mental disability condition is flatly and 
unthinkingly rejected.'" Views such as 
16 Bull Am Acad Psychiatry Law, Vol. 24, No. 1, 1996 
Insanity Defense Attitudes 
these reflect a false kind of "ordinary 
common sense."110 In criminal proce- 
dure, OCS presupposes two "self-evi- 
dent" truths: "First, everyone knows how 
to assess an individual's behavior. Sec- 
ond, everyone knows when to blame 
someone for doing wrong."l ' 
The next concept is what 1 call sanism, 
meaning an irrational prejudice of the 
same quality and character of other irra- 
tional prejudices that cause (and are re- 
flected in) prevailing social attitudes of 
racism, sexism, homophobia, and ethnic 
bigotry. It infects both our jurisprudence 
and our lawyering practices. Sanism is 
largely invisible, largely socially accept- 
able, and is based predominantly upon 
stereotype, myth, superstition, and dein- 
dividualization. ' l 2  
Judges, legislators, attorneys, and lay- 
persons all may exhibit sanist traits and 
profess sanist attitudes. It is no surprise 
that jurors reflect and project the conven- 
tional morality of the community, and 
judicial decisions in all areas of civil and 
criminal mental disability law continue to 
reflect and perpetuate sanist stereo- 
types. "' 
The concept of sanism must be consid- 
ered hand-in-glove with that of pretextu- 
ality. Sanist attitudes often lead to pretex- 
tual decisions. By this I mean simply that 
fact-finders accept (either implicitly or 
explicitly) testimonial dishonesty and en- 
gage similarly in dishonest (frequently 
meretricious) decisionmaking, specifi- 
cally where witnesses, especially "ex- 
pert" witnesses, show a "high propensity 
to purposely distort their testimony in or- 
der to achieve desired ends." The pretexts 
of the forensic mental health system are 
reflected in both the testimony of forensic 
experts and in the decisions of legislators 
and fact-finders. Experts frequently tes- 
tify in accordance with their own self- 
referential concepts of morality and 
openly subvert statutory and case law cri- 
teria that impose rigorous behavioral 
standards as predicates for commitment 
or that articulate functional standards as 
prerequisites for an incompetency-to- 
stand-trial finding. l 4  
Finally, we need to consider teleology. 
The legal system selectively (i.e., teleo- 
logically) either accepts or rejects social 
science evidence depending on whether 
or not the use of that data meets the a 
priori needs of the legal system. In cases 
where fact-finders are hostile to social 
science teachings, such data thus often 
meet with tremendous judicial resistance, 
and by the courts expressing their skepti- 
cism about, suspicions of, and hostilities 
toward such evidence. 15-' l 7  
Courts are often threatened by the use 
of such data. Social science's "complex- 
ities [may] shake the judge's confidence 
in imposed so~utions.""~ The courts' 
general dislike of social science is re- 
flected in the self-articulated claims that 
judges are unable to understand the data 
and to apply it properly to a particular 
case.I l 9  Thus, social science literature 
and studies that enable courts to meet 
predetermined sanist ends are often priv- 
ileged, while data that would require 
judges to question such ends are fre- 
quently rejected. Judges often select cer- 
tain proferred data that adheres to their 
preexisting social and political attitudes 
and use heuristic reasoning in rationaliz- 
ing such decisions. Social science data 
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are used pretextually in such cases and 
ignored in other cases to rationalize oth- 
erwise baseless judicial decisions. 
How do these concepts "play out" in 
insanity defense cases? At the outset, 
consider that the insanity defense is a 
textbook example of the power of heuris- 
tic reasoning. Insanity defense defenders 
attempt to use statistics (to rebut empiri- 
cal myths), scientific studies (to demon- 
strate that "responsibility" is a valid, ex- 
ternally verifiable term, and that certain 
insanity-pleading defendants are simply 
"different"), and principles of moral phi- 
losophy (to prove that responsibility and 
causation questions are legitimate ones 
for moral and legal inquiry). On the other 
hand, the vivid anecdote or the self-af- 
firming attribution overwhelm all at- 
tempts at rational discourse. Insanity de- 
fense decisionmaking is a uniquely fertile 
field in which the distortive "vividness" 
effect can operate and in which the legal 
system's poor mechanisms of coping with 
"systematic errors in intuitive judgment" 
made by heuristic "information proces- 
sors" become especially troubling. The 
chasm between perception and reality on 
the question of the frequency of use of the 
insanity defense, its success rate, and the 
"appropriateness" of its success rate all 
reflect this effect. 
Also, reliance on OCS is one of the 
keys to understanding why and how our 
insanity defense jurisprudence has devel- 
oped. Not only is it "prereflexive" and 
"self-evident," it is susceptible to pre- 
cisely the type of idiosyncratic, reactive 
decisionmaking that has traditionally typ- 
ified insanity defense legislation and liti- 
gation. Paradoxically, the insanity de- 
fense is necessary precisely because it 
rebuts "common-sense everyday infer- 
ences about the meaning of conduct."'20 
Empirical "investigations corroborate 
the inappropriate application of OCS to 
insanity defense decisionmaking. Judges 
"unconsciously express public feelings 
. . . reflect[ing] community attitudes and 
biases because they are 'close' to the 
c~mmunity." '~'  Virtually no members of 
the public can articulate what the substan- 
tive insanity defense test is. The public is 
seriously misinformed about both the 
"extensiveness and consequences" of an 
insanity defense plea,"122 and the public 
explicitly and consistently rejects any 
such defense substantively broader than 
the "wild beast" test.Iz3 
What about sanism? Insanity defense 
decisionmaking is often irrational. It re- 
jects empiricism, science, psychology, 
and philosophy and substitutes myth, ste- 
reotype, bias, and distortion. In short, our 
insanity defense jurisprudence is the ju- 
risprudence of sanism. 
Like the rest of the criminal trial pro- 
cess, the insanity defense process is rid- 
dled by sanist stereotypes and myths such 
as: (1) reliance on a fixed vision of pop- 
ular, concrete, visual images of "crazi- 
ness"; (2) an obsessive fear of feigned 
mental states; (3) a presumed absolute 
linkage between mental illness and dan- 
gerousness; (4) sanctioning of the death 
penalty in the case of mentally retarded 
defendants, some defendants who are 
"substantially mentally impaired," or de- 
fendants who have been found guilty but 
mentally ill; ( 5 )  the incessant confusion 
and conflation of substantive mental sta- 
tus tests; and (6) the regularity of sanist 
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appeals by prosecutors in insanity defense 
summations, arguing that insanity de- 
fenses are easily faked, that insanity ac- 
quittees are often immediately released, 
and that expert witnesses are readily 
duped. 
Sanism, in short, regularly and relent- 
lessly infects the courts in the same ways 
that it infects the public discourse. It syn- 
thesizes all of the irrational thinking 
about the insanity defense and helps cre- 
ate an environment in which groundless 
myths can shape the jurisprudence. As 
much as any other factor, it explains why 
we feel the way we do about "these peo- 
ple." As I will discuss next, it also pro- 
vides a basis for courts to engage in pre- 
textual reasoning in deciding insanity 
defense cases. 
Pretextual decisionmaking riddles the 
entire insanity defense decisionmaking 
process; it pervades decisions by forensic 
hospital administrators, police officers, 
expert witnesses, and judges. Hospital de- 
cisionmaking is a good example. A Task 
Force of the National Institutes of Mental 
Health, convened in the wake of the 
Hinckley acquittal, underscored this point 
in its final report: "From the perspective 
of the Hospital, in controversial cases 
such as Hinckley, the U.S. Attorney's Of- 
fice can be counted upon to oppose any 
conditional release recommendation [em- 
phasis added]."124 As John Parry has ex- 
plained, "hospitals have been pressured 
by public outrage to bend over backwards 
to make sure that no insanity acquittee is 
released too soon, even if such pressure is 
contrary to the intent and spirit of being 
found not guilty by reason of insanity."'25 
Expert witnesses are often similarly 
pretextual. In one case, a testifying doctor 
conceded that the may have "hedged" in 
earlier testimony (as to whether an insan- 
ity acquittee could be released) "because 
he did not want to be criticized should 
[the defendant] be released and then com- 
mit a criminal Most importantly, 
all aspects of the judicial decisionmaking 
process embody pretextuality. To a sig- 
nificant extent, this fear that defendants 
will "fake" the insanity defense to escape 
punishment continues to paralyze the le- 
gal system, despite an impressive array of 
empirical evidence that reveals (1) the 
minuscule number of such cases, (2) the 
ease with which trained clinicians are 
usually able to "catch" malingering in 
such cases, (3) the inverse greater likeli- 
hood that defendants-even at grave 
peril to their life-will more likely try to 
convince examiners that they are "not 
crazy," (4) the high risk in pleading the 
insanity defense (leading to statistically 
significant greater prison terms meted out 
to unsuccessful insanity pleaders), and ( 5 )  
the far greater length in stay that most 
successful insanity pleaders (a minute 
universe to begin with) remain in maxi- 
mum security facilities than they would 
have served had they been convicted on 
the underlying criminal indictment. In 
short, pretextuality dominates insanity 
defense decisionmaking. The inability of 
judges to disregard public opinion and 
inquire whether defendants have had fair 
trials is both the root and the cause of 
pretextuality in insanity defense jurispru- 
dence. 
Finally, little attention has been paid in 
general to the role of social science data 
in insanity defense decisionmaking. The 
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law's suspicion of the psychological sci- 
ences is well documented. The issues be- 
fore the courts in insanity defense cases 
raise such troubling issues for decision- 
makers that the courts' inherent suspicion 
of the social sciences will be further 
heightened. This, however, should not be 
surprising. Traditionally, social science 
has played a lesser role in the establish- 
ment of legal policy in areas "dominated 
by clear ideological division" or "political 
debate." The more social science contra- 
dicts "sentiments essential to other legal 
institutions," the less likely that it will 
influence legal ' 2 8  
I believe that much of the incoherence 
of insanity defense jurisprudence can be 
explained by these phenomena. Stereo- 
typed thinking leads to sanist behavior. 
Sanist decisions are rationalized by pre- 
textuality on the part of judges, legisla- 
tors, and lawyers and are buttressed by 
the teleologic use of social science evi- 
dence and empirical data. This combina- 
tion of sanism and pretextuality fits with 
traditional ways of thinking about (and 
acting toward) mentally disabled persons; 
it reifies centuries of myths and supersti- 
tions and is consonant with both the way 
we use heuristic cognitive devices and 
our own faux, nonreflective "ordinary 
common sense." 
How, then can we (should we) try to 
order a reconstruction of insanity defense 
jurisprudence? There may be a certain 
measure of hubris in attempting to artic- 
ulate a new vision of insanity defense 
jurisprudence, especially at this historical 
moment. Nonetheless, I offer these sug- 
gestions. I must begin with the rueful 
recognition that our societal track record 
is not one to inspire much optimism. 
Thus, while I am not entirely sanguine 
about the future of this enterprise, I am 
offering a series of what I will call be- 
havioral suggestions for insanity defense 
policymakers, scholars, and other citi- 
zens. I do this because I believe that, if 
there is to be any meaningful insanity 
defense reform, it is critical that each 
of us begin the process of changing the 
way we behave when confronted with the 
insanity defense and insanity defense 
pleaders. 
A Reconstruction 
Such behavioral changes are an abso- 
lutely essential precondition to certain 
needed legal reforms. I believe, for in- 
stance, that the Insanity Defense Reform 
Act of 1984 was nothing more than a 
pandering charade, and that Congress 
should abandon its return to this restric- 
tive form of the M'Naghten test. The 
combination of this cognitive-only test, 
coupled with the Act's placement of the 
burden of proof on defendants (by more 
than the preponderance standard), leads 
to an increase in the number of severely 
mentally disabled criminal defendants 
who will be inappropriately incarcerated 
in penal facilities. I also believe that the 
guilty but mentally ill verdict is notlung 
more than a meretricious sham, which 
should be abandoned. 
However, even if all of these reforms 
were to be judicially and/or legislatively 
mandated, the incoherence of our insanity 
defense jurisprudence would continue, 
because none of these legal questions fo- 
cuses on the single most important in- 
quiry (which I identified earlier): why do 
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we feel the way we do about "these 
people"? 
The answer to that question, as I have 
tried to demonstrate, is to be found in the 
way that centuries of myths have led to 
sanist thoughts and practices on the part 
of all insanity defense decisionmakers. 
This sanism-abetted by heuristic reason- 
ing and reliance on a false, alleged "ordi- 
nary common sense" and further contam- 
inated by our authoritarian spirit-leads 
to pretextual judicial decisions supported 
by teleologic reasoning. I thus conclude 
that it is only through behavioral change 
that there can be any meaningful amelio- 
ration of this jurisprudential incoherence. 
Behavioral Recommendations 
First, we must discuss the underlying 
issues openly. We must openly discuss 
sanism, identify it, and explain its perni- 
cious impact on all aspects of the legal 
system. System decisionmakers must reg- 
ularly engage in a series of "sanism 
checks" to insure, to the greatest extent 
possible, a continuing conscious and self- 
reflective evaluation of their decisions to 
best avoid sanism's power. As part of this 
strategy. we must educate judges and leg- 
islators and other policy-makers as to the 
roots of sanism, the malignancy of stereo- 
types, and the need to empathically con- 
sider alternative perspectives. 
Sanism infects all aspects of the insan- 
ity defense process: legislators, judges, 
jurors, and counsel, as well as the media 
that report on insanity defense cases. 
Each and every one of these participants 
bears some culpability in our current state 
of affairs, and all must bear the burden of 
eradicating sanist thought and behavior. 
Second, it is essential that the issues 
discussed here be added to the research 
agendas of social scientists, behaviorists, 
and legal scholars. Researchers must 
carefully examine case law and statutes to 
determine the extent to which social sci- 
ence is being teleologically used for 
sanist ends in insanity defense decision- 
making. They must also study the empir- 
ical database that rebuts the empirical and 
behavioral sanist myths and must con- 
front this discontinuity in their writings. 
In addition, researchers must enter the 
public arena and share their research find- 
ings with legislators, the media, and the 
public. 
These inquiries will help illuminate the 
ultimate impact of sanism on this area of 
the law, aid lawmakers and other policy- 
makers in understanding the ways that 
social science data are manipulated to 
serve sanist ends, and assist in the formu- 
lation of both normative and instrumental 
strategies that can be used to rebut sanism 
in insanity defense decisions. 
Third, we must find ways to attitudi- 
nally educate counsel for mentally dis- 
abled criminal defendants so that repre- 
sentation becomes more than the hollow 
shell it all too frequently is. We must 
restructure the provision of counsel to 
insure that mentally disabled individuals 
are no longer represented by, in Judge 
Bazelon's famous phrase, "walking vio- 
lations of the Sixth ~ m e n d m e n t . " ' ~ ~  
Fourth, we must create a new scholar- 
ship agenda that critically examines the 
questions I have raised here. 
Fifth, we need to consider carefully the 
burden of heuristic thinking. Judges, like 
the rest of us, use simplifying cognitive 
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heuristic devices in their thinking. Recent 
scholarly literature has begun to assess 
carefully the impact of heuristics on Su- 
preme Court decisionmaking; we need to 
apply this same thinking more compre- 
hensively so as to assess behavior of ex- 
pert witnesses, counsel, mental health 
professionals, and jurors. 
Sixth. we must rigorously apply thera- 
peutic jurisprudence principles to each 
aspect of the insanity defense. 130-135 We 
need to take what we learn from thera- 
peutic jurisprudence to strip away sanist 
behavior, pretextual reasoning, and teleo- 
logic decisionmaking from the insanity 
defense process. This would enable us to 
confront the pretextual use of social sci- 
ence data in an open and meaningful way. 
Seventh, we need to integrate insanity 
defense insights into all aspects of mental 
disability law. Mental disability is no 
longer-if it ever was-an obscure sub- 
specialty of legal practice and study. Each 
of its multiple strands forces us to make 
hard social policy choices about troubling 
social issues: psychiatry and social con- 
trol, the use of institutions, informed con- 
sent, personal autonomy, the relationship 
between public perception and social re- 
ality, the many levels of "competency," 
the role of free will in the criminal law 
system, the limits of confidentiality, the 
protection duty of mental health profes- 
sionals, and the role of power in forensic 
evaluations. These are all difficult and 
complex questions that are not suscepti- 
ble to easy, formulistic answers. When 
sanist thinking distorts the judicial pro- 
cess, the resulting doctrinal incoherence 
should not be a surprise. 
Conclusion 
The development of the insanity de- 
fense has tracked the tension between 
psychodynamics and punishment and re- 
flects our most profound ambivalence 
about both. On one hand, we are espe- 
cially punitive toward the mentally dis- 
abled, "the most despised and feared 
group in society"136; on the other, we 
recognize that in some narrow and care- 
fully circumscribed circumstances, excul- 
pation is-and historically has been- 
proper and necessary. This ambivalence 
infects a host of criminal justice policy 
issues involving mentally disabled crim- 
inal defendants beyond insanity defense 
decisionmaking: on issues of expert tes- 
timony, mental disability as a mitigating 
(or aggravating) factor at sentencing and 
in death penalty cases, and the creation of 
a "compromise" GBMI verdict. 
The post-Hinckley debate revealed the 
fragility of our insanity defense policies 
and demonstrated that there was simply 
not enough "tensile strength" in the crim- 
inal justice system to withstand the pub- 
lic's dysfunctionally heightened arousal 
that followed the jury verdict. Despite 
doctrinal changes and judicial glosses, the 
public remains wed to the "wild beast" 
test of 1724, a reflection of how we truly 
feel about "those people."137 It should 
thus be no surprise that, when Congress 
chose to replace the ALIIModel Penal 
Code insanity test with a stricter version 
of M'Naghten, that decision was seen as a 
victory by insanity defense supporters. 
These dissonances. tensions, and am- 
bivalences-again, rooted in medieval 
thought-continue to control the public's 
22 Bull Am Acad Psychiatry Law, Vol. 24, No. 1, 1996 
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psyche. They reflect the extent of the gap 
between academic discourse and social 
values and the "deeply rooted moral and 
religious tension" that surrounds respon- 
sibility decisionmaking.'" They lead to 
sanism, to pretextuality, and to teleologic 
decisionmaking. They seek confirmation 
in "ordinary common sense" and in the 
use of heuristic cognitive devices. Ours is 
a culture of punishment, growing out of 
our authoritarian spirit. Only when we 
acknowledge these psychic and physical 
realities-and the anthropology of insan- 
ity defense attitudes-can we expect to 
make sense of the underlying jurispru- 
dence. 
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